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Abstract
This paper applies incentive theory to the context of the European Union
(EU) Regional Policy. The core instruments of the policy are the Structural
Funds, capital grants that ow from the European Commission (EC) to Mem-
ber States and regional authorities to promote investment and growth at local
level. The EU grants need a co-payment by the regional government and do
not cover in full the investment cost. We model this situation, similar to several
other supra- national or federal contexts, as a simple principal-supervisor-agent
model of the investment game between a supranational player (the principal),
such as the EC, a non (fully) benevolent regional government (the supervisor),
and a private rm (the executing agency). We show how the role of providers
of additional information, the region (ex-ante) and an evaluator (ex-post) is
crucial to reducing the optimal value of the grant and to improving the inef-
ciencies caused by asymmetric information at the grant decision stage in a
federal hierarchy
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1 Introduction
This paper applies incentive theory to a hierarchy of contracts that is a typical fea-
ture of federations, where regional development policy competencies, including the
co-funding of infrastructure through grants, are often decentralized and partly dis-
tributed between di¤erent levels of decision-making at national level. In this context,
we contribute to the literature by modelling the optimal grant to an executing agency
under a co-payment between a benevolent supra-national planner and a regional gov-
ernment with a private agenda. Under asymmetric information, we show a role for
ex-ante and ex-post project evaluation respectively by the region and an auditor loyal
to the supra-national planner.
A major example of this hierarchical contracting process is the regional policy of
the European Union (EU). The core instruments are the Structural Funds. These are
capital grants that involve a range of actors and coordination mechanisms between
the European Commission (EC), the national and (sub) regional level (European
Commission [2007]) and investing rms. Moreover, the implementation of specic
tasks often involves several actors, including quasi-government bodies with super-
visory roles. Typically an ex-ante project appraisal is delegated by the EC to the
regional authorities, while the EC retains the right to send evaluators/monitors at a
later stage (ex-post evaluation).
Similar hierarchical contracts can be observed with some loans or grants by the
World Bank or other international organisations, including large NGOs that support
local development projects. Countries with a federal governments often support in-
frastructure expenditures by matching funds at central, state and lower government
level, with di¤erent supervisory and inspection roles.
In these complex environments, the policy decision maker acting as a (rela-
tively)benevolent principal, the one who usually o¤ers most of the investment funds
as a grant, cannot simply rely on commands to e¢ ciently implement his objectives.
There is a need to provide incentives to stimulate adequate e¤ort by di¤erent agents.
Information asymmetry, rents and incentives are the key analytical concepts in this
multi-agent context. We focus on the EU case because it o¤ers a common infrastruc-
ture investment policy framework shared by its 27 members states, and because of
the substantial amount of nance involved in the operations of the SF, around 350
billions Euro in 2007-2013, probably the largest investment plan in Europe after the
post-war Marshal Plan. We think, however, that our model has a more general in-
terest, because it applies to a large set of investment co-nancing schemes under
decentralized competencies with co-funding schemes. Thus, we shall interchangeably
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refer respectively to the EC or the supra-national planner, the region or the state, and
our results can be easily transferred to similar contexts, with suitable adaptations.
In the paper we assume that the supra-national player is a benevolent social plan-
ner. This assumption,in our opinion, is justied by the fact that the EC is fairly
independent from elected governments of the Member States, and because of its
special composition and voting mechanism. This makes it relatively di¢ cult for a
majority coalition with a private agenda to capture the EC in major investment de-
cisions. Similar reasoning (with some caution) applies e.g. to the World Bank as
compared with its clients, or federal o¢ ces versus local constituencies. The EC has
a mandate to implement a regional development policy. This is done by o¤ering re-
gional governments grants that are targeted to co-funding of infrastructure and other
public investment. Second, regional governments, in contrast with the EC, are elected
bodies. They have an objective function that combines social welfare maximization
and the private agenda of the policy-makers. We do not assume that all regional
governments are prone to corruption, but we consider realistic to think that policy
makers across the regions are, to a certain extent, self interested. Moreover we as-
sume, as previous literature does (in other contexts) that decentralised governments
are potentially more informed, but di¤er in their ability to elicit or interpret signals.
In this perspective, our model is closely related to La¤ont (2005), who discusses regu-
latory mechanisms in developing countries under governments with a private agenda.
We depart, however, from La¤ont (2005) because of the co-funding mechanism (and
other specic features).
The implementing agency can be seen as a rm under the control of a utility-
maximizing manager. This is more obvious when the rm is under private ownership,
and is just a simplication of the model when the rm is fully or partly government-
owned. Project appraisal (ex-ante) is under responsibility of the region, because it
would be too costly for the supra-national planner to acquire all the information
on any potential projects. Thus, the regional authority screens the local project
proposals, and select those to be proposed to the EC. We then introduce in the game
a ex-post evaluator, acting loyally on behalf of the supra-national planner (an o¢ ce
or an independent agency). In fact, project ex-post evaluation is formally required
by the EU regulations, and similar inspectors can be observed in many federations
or international institutions. The World Bank, for example, has a division entirely
devoted to ex-post project evaluation.
The game is as follows. The regional government identies ex-ante a socially de-
serving project, that would be however unprotable without a public subsidy. The
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EC o¤ers then a matching grant to the regional government, who needs to cover the
di¤erence between the EU grant and the investment funding gap, i.e. the cost not
recovered by future revenues. There are two technologies available to the implement-
ing rm. If the rm claims that it has access to the less e¢ cient technology, i.e. the
investment cost is higher than otherwise, the EC may send an ex-post evaluator. If
the evaluator discovers that the rm has lied, because in fact it had access to the
superior technology, there will be a penalty. Moreover, the EC o¤ers the regional
government a reward for ex-ante evaluation in order to avoid collusion between the
rm and the self-interested policy makers. We determine a)the incentive to be given
to the region to disclose information;b)the optimal grant; c) the optimal amount of
ex-post project evaluation that addresses the asymmetric information problem of the
European principal. We take the co-payment of the grant between the EC and the
regional authority as exogenous, e.g. xed by a law or an international treaty.
Information providers have a crucial role in minimizing rents that accrue to rms
and to self-interested policy makers, and well designed ex-ante and ex-post evaluation
contracts should be essential ingredients of co-funding of infrastructure in a multi-
government setting, under an appropriate incentive mechanism for the grant decision.
The setting we describe is entirely new in the literature on hierarchical contracting,
particularly because of the role of the co-funding mechanism and of project evaluation.
We show that any investment grant scheme with cost-plus rules (as the one current
adopted for the EU Structural Funds) is ine¢ cient. We also show that some specic
parameters, i.e. the e¢ ciency of collusion between the regional managing authority
and the rm, the precision of the signal about rms e¢ ciency in ex- ante project
evaluation, the cost of ex-post evaluation determine the optimal grant. We argue
that in an international setting these parameters are country or region specic, hence
it is necessary to move away from grant schemes that are too rigid.
The paper has the following structure. Section 2 briey discusses our research
motivation and some earlier contributions. Section 3 o¤ers some background in-
formation on the EU Regional Policy context, in order to make more explicit the
intuition behind the model. Section 4 presents our model, and Section 5 concludes.
2 Research motivation and earlier literature
The approach we suggest in order to model an investment game between a supra-
national body, a regional government, and the executing rm, is related to earlier
literature on hierarchical contracts when there is delegation of monitoring to a super-
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visor. We mention here (very) selectively some earlier frames, in order to show our
research motivation, its relationship with other approaches that have been proposed,
and our contribution.
Hierarchical contracting is a feature of many real life organizations, including
governments and rms. It arises when a principal, heading an organization, does
not retain full control on the contracting and communication relationships with the
agents at lower levels of the hierarchy. This loss of control can take many forms
(for an exhaustive taxonomy see Mookherjee [2006]) and involves di¤erent degrees of
delegation of tasks to middlemen, supervisors or subcontractors. We are focusing on
an environment in which the principal contracts with a manager (subcontractor) who
is then in charge of contracting with the remaining agents.
This context is related to, but departs from, previous literature on scal federalism
and grants in a federal environment under asymmetric information. While Bordignon
et al (2001) or Bucovetsky et al (1998) focus on distorting local taxation, and lump-
sum transfers under asymmetric information on tax bases between the federal state
and regions, here we are going to focus on the expenditure side only, under a hierarchy
of contracts, with a co-payment. We simply assume that optimal lump-sum taxes and
transfers are not available, hence there is a marginal cost of public funds. Di¤erently
from Breuillè and Gary-Bobo (2007) we do not consider free mobility of citizens across
regions in the Tiebout tradition. We also do not consider the redistribution objectives
that motivate the papers by Lockwood (1999) or Cornes and Silva (2002).
Another possible approach to deal with a multi-government environment, as in
the EU regional policy context, would be to follow La¤ont and Tirole [1993] and Mar-
timort [1992,1999], in the framework of a theory of multi-principals, where di¤erent
incentive mechanisms compete with each others. In fact, the EU is indeed an array of
several government bodies (the EC, the national and regional governments, etc.) and
they regulate di¤erent entities (e.g. municipalities, private rms, etc.). The compe-
tencies in regional policy are, however, usually di¤erent in each layer of government,
and the total amount of EU grants (the Structural Funds) allocated to each Member
State and region are set ex ante by budgetary decisions (inter-governmental agree-
ments). Hence, there are no competing contracts, and a multi-principal framework
does not seem appropriate to our problem. Nevertheless, di¤erent regulators need to
concur in some decisions, and we want to model this aspect of partial decentraliza-
tion. Caillaud, et al [1996] study public decision-making when local authorities o¤er
incentive contracts to local agents, in a context of asymmetric information. Their
model refers explicitly to incentive policy in the EU context, and they assume, as
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we do, that national authorities have better information on their agents, but less
bargaining power than central authorities at the community level. This may justify
the delegation of tasks to regional governments by the EC. We depart from their
model because of we introduce the co-payment mechanism and we also consider the
role of project evaluation. Huber and Runkel (2006) consider an environment, where
there is a federation with two types of local governments and a central government,
with the former di¤ering in the cost of providing public goods. Under asymmetric
information,the authors show which types of grants are second- best. They show
why, in particular, unconditional grants are always ine¢ cient in their context. The
types of grant o¤ered in order to implement industrial policies is discussed by Wren
[2003]. He considers discretionary industrial assistance schemes, when there is an
uninformed government and a uniform distribution of rms with di¤ering unit costs.
Discretion in this context is a kind of project screening device, in order to learn the
type and to reduce the informational rentsof automatic assistance. In our paper,
to simplify, we assume that there is only one contract type, and the screening func-
tion is assigned to the regional government who is supposed to know better than the
EC the rm characteristics. Melumad et al [1995] o¤er a model where the principal
delegates to some agents in a hierarchy the authority to communicate and contract
with agents at lower levels. They show the benets and costs of delegation, and nd
that monitoring and a specic sequence of contracts are necessary for delegation to
achieve second-best results. In our framework, we get a similar result by the parallel
evaluation and co-funding contracts between principal and regional government, the
contract between the latter and the rm, and ex-post evaluation by an inspector sent
by the principal.
One aspect we are interested in, is the potential impact on the game solution of
a penalty if ex-post evaluation discovers that the rm was not of the low e¢ ciency
type in our context. There are many possible approaches on this issue. For example,
De Marzo et al [2005] show that self-regulation in some professions can be seen as the
delegation by government of enforcing antifraud rules to an organization. They model
contracting and enforcement as a two-tier problem. First the delegated regulator
chooses its enforcement policy, i.e. the probability of investigations and a penalty
schedule. Under such arrangements agents compete by o¤ering contracts to their
customers. Interestingly they conclude that the threat of government enforcement
leads to more enforcement by the regulatory body of the profession, and this pre-
empts any government enforcement. This has some resemblance with the subsidiarity
principle at the EU level, where the role of the EC is seen as a complement to the role
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of the Member States, and it is perceived that the mere existence of EC investigation
powers o¤er to the MS an incentive to discover frauds in their constituency in order
to avoid EC anti-fraud initiatives.
More recently Akai and Silva (2009) discuss the soft budget syndromein fed-
erations, where a central government o¤ers additional capital to a regional body in
order to prevent a performance failure by the latter. Ex-post perfect information is
needed to cure soft budgets, and this o¤ers an incentive for the region to reveal its
information. Their problem is clearly related to ours, even if in a di¤erent context,
because we have co-payment built in our mechanism.
Finally, our approach is more closely related to La¤ont [2005], where he discusses
a situation where policy-makers in less developed countries have a private agenda,
regulators can be corrupted, and where ex post evaluation to monitor the outcome
of a decision (a privatization, i.e. a public divestiture) is costly. We consider that
regional governments in some member states of the EU, particularly in regions lagging
behind, are not (fully) of the benevolent type, and try at the same time to maximize
the welfare of their constituency, but also they want to extract some private benets
from the contracts with the agents. We look at public investment as similar to
privatization, because usually the rm involved in building an infrastructure is a
private one, and can try to bribe the regional government. In the La¤ont model
there is ex-post evaluation, but we add to the hypothesis that this evaluator is sent by
the EC, a benevolent government (perhaps just because of the mutual countervailing
power of the many governments that appoint it). Before turning to the model, in
the next section we briey give some background information about the EU regional
policy context .
3 Infrastructure co-nancing under the EU regional
policy
In 2007-2013 the EU Structural Funds will contribute with matching grants to the
investment plans of 27 countries, including 12 new members (mostly former transition
economies). The EU seven-years budget supporting this e¤ort will draw from a
provision of around EUR 350 billion for Cohesion policy. A substantial part of the
grants is going to be allocated to infrastructure projects, in regions lagging behind in
their endowment of basic stock of capital compared to the rest of the EU. Moreover,
there will be a leverage e¤ect of the EU funds on public and private nance, because
in most cases Brussels will contribute only a part of the cost, and the rest of capital
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expenditure must be matched by other sources of nance.
Ceilings for EU co-nancing are di¤erent according the region and the fund ( the
overall macroeconomiccap at national level for EU grants is 4% of GDP per year).
In this paper we focus on revenue generating public projects.
According to Art. 55 of the EU Structural Funds regulation, these are dened as:
any operation involving an investment in infrastructure the use of which is subject
to charges born directly by users or any operation involving the sale or rent of land
or buildings or any other provision of service against payment.
For these projects the EC contributes to lling the gap between the present value
of investment costs and the present value of the net revenues by the approval of an EU
grant. We turn now to explaining the current mechanism and its problems. Similar
problems arise in other contexts, including some US federal programmes, and some
international assistance schemes for local development, but we do not review them
here.
Project selection and ex-ante evaluation within this regional policy framework is
normally the sole responsibility of the national authorities. However for very large
projects (with a total investment cost of more than EUR 50 million, or 25 for envi-
ronmental projects), the EC requires Member States to submit a cost-benet analysis
(CBA) and then takes a specic co-nancing decision, (European Commission,2006).
In addition to relying on the governments of the Member States to acquire this
information and ex-ante project evaluation, the SF regulations state that the EC is
responsible for ex-post evaluation: it can appoint experts that after the completion
of the project will re-assess its benets and costs. Art 49 of the above mentioned
regulation states that:
The Commission shall carry out an ex post evaluation for each objec-
tive in close cooperation with the Member States and managing author-
ities. Ex post evaluation shall cover all operational programmes under
each objective and examine the extent to which resources were used, the
e¤ectiveness and e¢ ciency of Fund programming and the socioeconomic
impact....
Hence, there is a clear provision for ex-ante and ex-post evaluation in the SF
regulations, but there is , however, no clear link between the investment co-nancing
decision and such evaluations (except when fraud is discovered). Florio and Vignetti
[2006] suggest that without a contractuallink between evaluation and co-nancing,
a misallocation of Structural Funds may arise, and o¤er evidence of this.
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In principle, projects expecting a positive nancial net present value have no
funding gap and thus do not generally receive a grant from the EU (although special
rules apply to productive investments under state aid regimes, e.g. EU subsidies to
building communication or energy networks).
The rationale of the funding-gap approach is to determine the projects self-
nancing ratio so as to grant, in principle, to the investor not less and no more than
what is actually needed to implement a socially benecial, but nancially loss-making
project. The problem with the funding gapapproach is obvious: the applicant has
a clear incentive to exaggerate expected costs and to underestimate revenues, to
maximize the grant.
Given the ceilings, the remaining of the funding gap, i.e. the project cost not
lled in by the EU grant, is covered by a matching grant by the Member State (MS).
Because member states are often under strict budgetary constraints, they have an
incentive to collude with the implementing agency to obtain a larger EU grant. The
member states, however, cannot subscribe any loss-making project, because, if the
funding gap exceeds the grant ceiling, they have to contribute the di¤erence.
Unfortunately, however, under asymmetric information the wrong incentiveprob-
lem is still in place, because it is not clear to what extent the national or regional
governments will not collude with the investors in trying to extract a larger rent
from the granting mechanism. We suggest below a framework for the analysis of this
hierarchical contracting problem, and we solve it.
4 The model
4.1 Utility functions and the full-information solution
As previously discussed the European Commission wants to nance an indivisible
project in one of the member states which is not nancially viable without government
intervention. The project has a positive economic net present value but a negative
nancial net present value that makes the project non protable for a private rm. A
grant covering the di¤erence between revenues and investment plus operating costs
would allow the rm to carry out the project without a loss.
Since EU funding are limited the goal of the Commission is to nance projects with
the minimum expenditure necessary, that is the one that guarantees the participation
of the rm while maximizing social benets.
In other words if the return from the projects are given by the operating revenues
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R we have a situation where, without a grant:
R  TotalCosts < 0, (1)
while with a grant the total prots become non negative:
R +GRANT   TotalCosts  0. (2)
We assume the cost function of the rm is given by:
TotalCosts = c+K
=    e+K (3)
where K is the cost of capital which is common knowledge, c =  e is the operating
cost which is composed of a rm specic characteristics  that is private information
to the rm and an unobservable e¤ort level e which reduces the cost.
For each level of e¤ort e the rm must endure a disutility  (e) (where  0 > 0,
 00 > 0).
 is an adverse selection parameter that indicates the level of e¢ ciency of the
rm, we assume it can take two values  and  with  > . We assume that  is
not too large, so that it will always be socially benecial to require production from
both types of rms. It is independently distributed with  = Pr
 
 = 

and the
distribution is common knowledge. e is non-negative and is a moral hazard variable
which is decided by the rm after the grant has been approved and is also private
information to the rm.
The utility function of the rm is:
U = R + eG  (   e) K    (e) (4)
where as described before R are revenues, eG is the grant, (   e) +K are total costs
and  (e) is the disutility of e¤ort.
The Commission sets the grant with the goal of maximizing social welfare, the
grant is nanced with distortive taxation which creates a social cost 1. Consumers
net welfare from the project can be written as:
V = S  R  (1 + ) eG (5)
1This assumption is just another way of saying that the EU puts more weight on consumer
surplus than the rms rent. As a consequence the Commission wishes to minimize the transfer
from tax-payers to the rm.
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where S is the surplus generated by the project, R is the revenue (paid by consumers)
and (1 + ) eG is the total cost of the grant.
We assume (as in La¤ont and Tirole [1993]) that total costs and revenues are ex-
post observable and we make the accounting convention that the Commission receives
the revenues, pays the costs and gives the rm a netgrant:
G = R + eG  (   e) K (6)
so that we simplify the expression for the rms utility function to:
U = G   (e) . (7)
We can also rewrite consumersnet welfare as:
V = S  R  (1 + ) [G R + (   e) +K]
= S + R  (1 + ) [(   e) +K +  (e)]  (1 + )U (8)
Social welfare is then:
W = V + U
= S + R  (1 + ) [(   e) +K +  (e)]  U . (9)
If the Commission knew the true value of  and could observe e then the only
constraint she would face is the participation constraint of the rm:
U  0 (10)
Since giving up rent to the rm is costly (because of the marginal cost of public funds)
the above constraint will be binding and the problem the Commission would solve in
a world of perfect information becomes:
max
e
W = S + R  (1 + ) [(   e) +K +  (e)] (11)
From the FOC with respect to e we nd the rst best level of cost reducing e¤ort e:
 0 (e) = 1 (12)
which is that level that equates the marginal disutility of e¤ort with the marginal ben-
et of e¤ort (the marginal cost reduction e¤ect), while from the binding participation
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constraint we obtain the rst best grant:
eG =  (e) + (   e) +K  R. (13)
4.2 The optimal grant
Di¤erently from the previous section we now assume that the Commission cannot
observe e and knows only the probability distribution of .
We know that the grant can take the form of an optimal revelation mechanism
which will apply the standard results of incentive theory.
The grant will be a contract conditional on the revelation of the e¢ ciency para-
meter. In other words, a rm claiming to be e¢ cient, i.e. of type , will be o¤ered
a grant-cost reimbursement pair f(G; c)g, while a rm which will reveal to be ine¢ -
cient, i.e. of type , will be o¤ered a pair
 
G; c
	
. This contract is equivalent to
the following

(U; e) ;
 
U; e
	
that species, for every type of rm, an ex-post rent
and an e¤ort level.
The optimal grant will be designed satisfying two sets of constraints, the partici-
pation constraints of the previous section and the incentive compatibility constraints
which will ensure the truthful revelation of the e¢ ciency parameter by the rm.
The rst set of constraints is:
U  0 (14)
U  0. (15)
Incentive compatibility constraints are:
U = G       c  G       c (16)
U = G       c  G       c . (17)
The above inequalities make sure that an e¢ cient rm will not gain from claiming to
be ine¢ cient and receiving the grant designed for the ine¢ cient rm and vice-versa.
Let  (e) =  (e)   (e ) be an increasing and convex function of e.
Rewrite the IC of the e¢ cient rm:
G   (e)  G        + e+  (e)   (e)
G   (e)  G   (e) +  (e)
U  U +  (e) (18)
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and the one for the ine¢ cient rm:
G   (e)  G        + e+  (e)   (e)
G   (e)  G   (e)   (e+ )
U  U    (e+ ) (19)
The optimal grant can now be derived by maximizing expected social welfare
subject to the incentive compatibility and participation constraints. The program is:
max
fU;e;U;eg


S + R  (1 + )     e+K +  (e)  U
+ (1  ) S + R  (1 + )     e+K +  (e)  U
s.t.(14),(15),(18),(19).
In this type of problems the participation constraint of the ine¢ cient rm (15) and
the incentive compatibility constraint of the e¢ cient (18) will be binding. We then
have:
U = 0 (20)
U =  (e) . (21)
After substituting the above the optimization problem simplies to:
max
fe;eg


S + R  (1 + )     e+K +  (e)   (e)
+ (1  ) S + R  (1 + )     e+K +  (e) (22)
From the FOC we obtain the required levels of cost reducing e¤ort:
 0 (e) = 1 (23)
 0 (e) = 1  
1 + 

1  
0 (e) . (24)
This is a standard solution that requires the e¢ cient rm to carry out the optimal rst
best level of cost reducing e¤ort while the level of e¤ort required from an ine¢ cient
rm is lower than the rst best because of the optimal trade-o¤ between e¢ ciency
and informational rent. The departure from the e¢ cient level of e¤ort is greater
when  is greater, that is when transferring more resources to the rm creates more
distortive taxation.
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The grant o¤ered to the two types of rms are the following:
eG =  (e) +  (e) +     e+K  R (25)eG =  (e) +     e+K  R (26)
and they are both higher than the rst best grant, but for di¤erent reasons. eG is
higher because the Commission pays an informational rent  (e) to the e¢ cient rm,
while eG is higher because the level of cost reducing e¤ort is ine¢ ciently downward
distorted and so the operating costs are higher. Asymmetric information between the
European Commission and the rm makes project nancing more expensive.
4.3 The role of ex-ante and ex-post evaluators
We now add to the above standard principal-agent model two additional players, the
regional government and an ex-post evaluator.
The regional government pays a predened share of the grant (co-payment) awarded
by the Commission and covers a supervisory role. Because of its proximity to the
rm the regional government is in fact assumed to have an informational advantage
with respect to the Commission. We assume that, before the grant o¤er is made, the
regional government receives a signal  about the e¢ ciency status of the rm. This
signal is observed by the rm. The regional government is non-benevolent and can
be led by the rm into not disclosing information to the Commission in exchange of
private benets.
More than the local government being "crooks", this highlights the fact that the
local interests and the supranational interests are not perfectly aligned.
The ex-post evaluator is sent, with some probability, by the Commission after
the project has been built. If sent, the auditor will learn, with probability one,
veriable information about the parameter . We make the further assumption that
the ex-post evaluator has no discretion and cannot lie about what he has learned (i.e.
cannot be corrupted), this again is to stress the di¤erence between central and local
interests and the ex-post evaluator is an extension of the benevolent higher level of
government (the Commission). If the outcome of the valuation is that the rm has
lied at a previous stage then there is a ne to pay.
The timing of our game is now the following:
1. the rm learns ;
2. the regional government learns ;
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3. the Commission o¤ers two contingent grants;
4. the rm chooses the grant;
5. grant is paid;
6. ex-post evaluator is sent with probability p;
7. possible nes to be paid.
Because this is a nite game we apply backward induction and start by studying
the e¤ect of the introduction of an ex-post evaluator.
Let p be the probability of sending an ex-post auditor, p2H the cost of the audit
and P the exogenous punishment for the rm if it turns out it lied to the Commission2.
An optimal grant will now be a pair of triplets
 
U; e; p

;
 
U; e; p
	
, in other words
the o¤er by the Commission will include contingent probabilities of audit together
with a rent and e¤ort level.
We will consider the punishment to be exogenous and not too high, so that the
participation constraint will be satised.
It is worth stressing that there is no need to evaluate a rm claiming to be e¢ cient,
because the ine¢ cients type incentive constraint is slack anyway and auditing is
costly. In other words, it will never happen that an ine¢ cient rm claims to be
e¢ cient, hence, at an optimum, we necessarily have p = 0.
The only constraint that needs to be modied is therefore the IC of an e¢ cient
rm:
U =  (e)  pP (27)
in other words, the benet from an untruthful report are lowered by the probability
of audit and the expected punishment. As a consequence also the informational rent
that needs to be paid to ensure a truthful report is also reduced.
The role played by the regional government is instead more complex.
By assumption the signal  2 ?; 	, this means that the regional government
either discovers the rm to be e¢ cient or it will learn nothing from the signal. More
precisely if  =  the local government observes  =  with probability  and nothing
with probability 1  . If  =  it does not observe anything.
We make the additional assumption that the signal  =  is hard information,
meaning that it can be hidden but not manipulated.
2On delegated random auditing see Faure-Grimaud, La¤ont and Martimort [1999] and La¤ont
and Martimort [2002].
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If the regional government was benevolent, then the Commission would be able to
o¤er the rst best grant when  =  and o¤er the second best contract with updated
probability of the rm being e¢ cient, given by b = (1 )
1  , whenever  = ? (that is
when the regional governments signal is not informative).
We instead assume that the regional government is non benevolent and can be
led by the local rm to conceal unfavorable evidence about the e¢ ciency parameter3.
Some private benets paid by the rm would represent the gain for the regional
government.
The rm is to stand losing the informational rent if evidence about  =  is
brought forward to the Commission, this, after the introduction of random auditing
by the ex-post evaluator, amounts to  (e)   pP . This implies that any payment b
that the rm might be willing to o¤er to the local government has an obvious upper
bound:
b   (e)  pP . (28)
The utility function of the regional government is given by the sum of the regional
consumers net surplus plus the private benet it might receive from the rm:
LG = bS   bR   (1 + ) eG+ kb (29)
where bS is the change in regional consumer surplus from the project, bR is the share
of revenues paid by regional consumers,  is the share of the grant that the regional
government will have to nance, (1 + ) eG is the total cost of the grant as before, b
are private benets and k 2 (0; 1) is the e¢ ciency of collusion. k 2 (0; 1) implies that
not all the funds spent by the rm arrive in the pockets of the regional government,
this may be due to the transaction costs of such not-very-legal activity or to the
nature of the goods exchanged.
To avoid collusion in equilibrium the Commission will have to pay some contingent
transfer m to the local government whenever it reports that the rm is e¢ cient.
The incentive compatibility constraint for the local government is:
bS   bR   (1 + ) eG +m  bS   bR   (1 + ) eG+ kb (30)
which ensures that the local government will prefer to report an e¢ cient rm, receive
m and pay a share of eG instead of hiding evidence, receive kb and pay a share of eG.
3We model collusion in the spirit of Tirole [1979].
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This is a moral hazard constraint that will induce the regional government to behave
like the Commission prefers. In other words, the Commission must compensate the
regional government for its help in the evaluation of the project (and for giving up the
transfer from the local rm), in this way truthful reporting about the rm parameters
becomes convenient for the regional government.
After a few calculations we nd:
m  [k    (1 + )] ( (e)  pP ) . (31)
So in case the rm is e¢ cient and the regional government nds hard evidence
about that, then the Commission does not pay any informational rent to the rm,
instead it pays a transfer to the regional government. The gain for the Commission
comes from m being lower than U for two reasons:
1. ine¢ ciency of collusion (k < 1)
2. cost sharing between the Commission and the regional government (if the rm
is e¢ cient also the local government saves on his share of the grant)
Because of the incentives given to regional government to reveal information the
solution will be the rst best full-information one with probability , that is the
probability that the rm is e¢ cient and that the local government observes it.
More precisely the objective function for the Commission is now:
max
fU;e;U;e;pg


S + R  (1 + )     e+K +  (e)  m
+ (1  ) S + R  (1 + )     e+K +  (e)  U
+ (1  ) S + R  (1 + )     e+K +  (e)  U   p2H , (32)
this is composed by three elements: with probability  the rm is e¢ cient and the
regional government observes a meaningful signal therefore the Commission compen-
sates the regional government for its contribution, with probability  (1  ) the rm
is e¢ cient but the regional government does not observe anything so the rm must
be given some rent to reveal its parameters truthfully and nally with probability
(1  ) the rm is ine¢ cient so the Commission will send an ex-post evaluator with
probability p and will pay the evaluation cost p2H.
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The constraints that the Commission has to satisfy are the following:
U = 0 (33)
U =  (e)  pP (34)
m = [k    (1 + )] ( (e)  pP ) (35)
We have assumed that the rm observes the local government signal, more for-
mally we can say that the information sets are nested. This implies that the con-
straints have to be satised in each state of the world. With probability  there is
no asymmetric information anymore between the local government and the rm and,
as we previously said, the rst best grant and e¤ort can be implemented. When the
signal is not informative, and the rm is e¢ cient, it must be given an informational
rent that is lower if compared to the one in the previous section when the ex-post
evaluator was not present.
From the FOC we obtain the following:
 0 (e) = 1 (36)
 0 (e) = 1  
1 + 

1  
0 (e) [(1  ) +  (k    (1 + ))] . (37)
In other words also when the rm is e¢ cient and the local government does not receive
and informative signal (that happens with probability  (1  )) the cost reducing
e¤ort required is the e¢ cient level, what is di¤erent are the costs for the Commission
which are now higher because U > m. The informational rent for an e¢ cient rm is
in fact higher than the transfer required to have a truthful report from the regional
government.
In case of an ine¢ cient rm the cost reducing level of e¤ort is distorted away
from the e¢ cient level, but it is less distorted than in the case without the regional
government.
So the grant awarded by the European Commission will be the following contin-
gent plan:
with probability  : eG =  (e) + (   e) +K  R
with probability  (1  ) : eG =  (e)  pP +  (e) +     e+K  R
with probability (1  ) : eG =  (e) +     e+K  R
The presence of the regional government has an e¤ect also on the probability of
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sending an ex-post auditor, the optimal probability is:
p =

1  
P
2H
[(1  ) +  (k    (1 + ))] (38)
which is decreasing in , the precision of the signal received by the regional govern-
ment.
It is now evident how the European Commission may benet from ex-ante and
ex-post evaluators when making grant decisions. The presence of an ex-post evaluator
and the potential punishment contribute to the reduction of the informational rent
that must be given to the rm to ensure truthtelling, this has a direct e¤ect on the
grant which is equally reduced.
An indirect e¤ect comes from the fact that the stake of collusion between the rm
and the regional government is reduced. In other words the amount of resources that
the rm may loose if the regional government reports everything it has learned is
now lower, as a consequence the sum available to contribute private benets to the
regional government is also reduced. This makes ghting collusion a bit cheaper for
the Commission.
The presence of the regional government acting as an ex-ante evaluator also brings
benets and savings to the Commission. The reason is that, in the event of a mean-
ingful signal received by the regional government, it is cheaper to obtain truthful
revelation from the regional government than from the rm itself. This is due to
the ine¢ ciency of collusion which gives the Commission and advantage over the rm
when transferring funds to the regional government and to the co-payment of the
grant which realigns, a least in part, the incentives of the regional government and
those of the Commission.
4.4 Some comparative statics
The EU structural funds are destined to the nancing of projects in all of the member
states which are likely to di¤er under many and important aspects. Some of the
parameters of the model can be used to take into account some possible di¤erences
and to evaluate how the optimal decision by the Commission will vary.
1. The copayment share . The percentage of the project which is to be nanced
by the regional government is not xed. It will vary from region to region and
everything equal it is likely to be higher in richer member states (typically
the "old" members). As  increases the interests of the regional government
will be more in line with those of the Commission implying that it is easier
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for the latter to ght collusion at the evaluation stage. To the contrary the
regional governments of the new member states must be given a more generous
compensation to carry out the evaluation task. Adding to the higher share
nanced by the Commission this makes the nancing of projects in the new
member states relatively more expensive than in the old member states.
2. The e¢ ciency of collusion k. Diverting funds into the hands of local politi-
cians can be more easily done in some states than in others. In some countries
where the regional governments are used to obtain private benets from the po-
litical activity it will be easier for the rm to convince the regional government
to conceal some evidence about its e¢ ciency parameters. This means we will
face a higher k that will take various forms: the presence of many channels in
which funds can ow from rms to politicians and administrators, higher toler-
ance from the public, less e¢ ciency of the regional police in ghting corruption
or an easier way to transform the given goods and services into money. Those
countries with a lower k (but with similar growth opportunities), those that are
less prone to collusion, will be a more fertile ground for the Commission grant.
Lower sums will achieve better projects.4
3. The precision of the signal . The probability with which regional governments
observe the cost parameters of the rm may be di¤erent across countries. As 
increases towards one we observe two e¤ects:
1. the rst best will be implemented more often;
2. the distortion in cost reducing e¤ort is lower.
Project in member states where regional governments are better at acquiring
information5 will be more e¢ cient to implement and less expensive to nance.
4. The cost of ex-post evaluation H. Accounting procedures and certication stan-
dards vary across member states. It is therefore reasonable to assume that the
cost of ex-post evaluation will be lower in those states where the information
for nancial and economic analysis of projects is more complete and credible.
Clearly the probability of an ex-post evaluation increases as the cost of the au-
dit decreases, contributing therefore to the reduction of the grant necessary to
nance the project carried out by an e¢ cient rm.
4In principle empirical testing or simulations can be done by proxying k with a governance index,
such as the one proposed by Kaufman ,Kray and Mastruzzi [2005].
5This can be proxied, for example, by the human capital available in the public sector.
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5. The di¤erence in e¢ ciency : The higher is , that is the higher the dif-
ference in the operating costs of the implementing rm, the higher the distor-
tions. In particular, the importance of eliciting information about an technology
with lower costs becomes more important, and as a consequence the informa-
tional rent is higher. This has an e¤ect on the level of cost reducing e¤ort (lower)
and of the grant (higher). The optimal contract will therefore implement a less
distortive outcome in regions where rms are more homogeneous.
5 Conclusions
Our model contributes to the application of incentive theory in a multi-government
setting by focusing on a co-nancing grant decisions in the context of regional policies.
Our results show the optimal incentive contract for the grant, under an exogenous
sharing of it between a supra-national planner and a local authority. We also how
ex-ante and ex-post evaluation, as in fact embodied in some legislation, can critically
contribute to contain socially costly rents. To do so, however, the contract between
the EC (or any supra-national benevolent development agency) should establish a
formal mechanism of rewards and punishments.
The regional government, who is responsible for ex-ante evaluation, should be
paid to disclose ex-ante information on the rm and to avoid collusion. There should
be a punishment following ex-post evaluation when the rm has been discovered to
be more e¢ cient than it claimed ex-ante.
We claim that fairly standard incentive theory provides a sound basis for under-
standing how di¤erent players interact in an investment planning game. We assume
that each player acts to maximize his or her particular objectives. Having two govern-
ments, one supra-national and benevolent and the other one, more informed but with
a private agenda, adds complexity to the principal-agent framework, but is realistic.
Our story have simple and important policy implications, that go beyond the
European Union regional policy context. First, we show that ex-ante revelation of
information to a federal government or a supra-national body by the region should be
considered as a specic contract between the centre and the regional body. Second,
the capital grant must be endogenous even when the co-payment share is exoge-
nous. Rigid grant ceilings linked to investment costs, as often seen in matching-grant
legislation in federations are ine¢ cient. In fact these are cost-reimbursement rules
that provide the wrong incentives to decentralised governments and executing agen-
cies. The optimal grant depends upon region-specic parameters, hence it must vary
21
across regions. Third, ex-post evaluation is a crucial mechanism in order to contain
rents, and we have shown in a precise sense how ex post project evaluation raises the
e¢ ciency of hierarchical contracting in a multi-government context with a co-payment
mechanism between the di¤erent layers of government.
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